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Abstract 
This master’s thesis paper proposes a new dimensional structure for the safety climate 
construct. The basis for this structure is data collected in the period 2001 – 2013 by the 
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway through the RNNP survey. The data material is vast; a 
total of 51 803 respondents have participated in the survey, making it the largest safety 
climate assessment conducted in the Norwegian oil and gas industry. The proposed 
dimensional structure was obtained through a dynamic combination of explorative Principal 
Component Analysis in SPSS and a qualitative and theoretical based assessment of the 
strength and structure of the data driven dimensional structures. The result of this repetitive 
process is presented as a six dimensional safety climate structure consisting of 30 items, given 
the name “The Hexagonal Safety Climate Structure”.  
The proposed dimensional structure of this thesis fits well with the three-dimensional 
basis of the RNNP survey. The proposed structure provides a theoretically supported and 
good psychometric solution to the dimensional structure of the safety climate construct of the 
RNNP survey. It is recommended that the 22 safety related questions that are not part of the 
dimensional structure are revised or removed from the RNNP survey.  
The assessment of safety climate and safety culture has major issues to overcome. No 
clear conceptual agreement exists, theoretical models are lacking and the validity of the 
measurement instruments is questionable. Until these issues are sorted, the use of surveys to 
measure safety climate will still have significant potential for improvement. 
Keywords: safety climate, safety culture, principal component analysis, Norwegian 
continental shelf 
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The Hexagonal Safety Climate Structure: 
– Proposing a new safety climate structure, and assessing its implications 
for the RNNP survey 
 
Introduction 
The first uncontrolled blowout on the Norwegian continental shelf [NCS] occurred on 
April 22nd 1977 on the Ekofisk B platform, and resulted in the worst oil spill in Norwegian 
history (Norwegian Oil and Gas Association [Norwegian Oil and Gas], 2010). The official 
inquiry of the incident concluded that human errors, such as faults in documentation and 
improper planning, were the major factor responsible for the blowout (Christou & 
Konstantinidou, 2012). Similarly, the causes of both the Piper Alpha explosion in 1988 and 
the Macondo blowout in 2010 were, amongst others, identified as a lack of communication, 
training, emergency preparedness and bad safety culture in the organizations (Christou & 
Konstantinidou, 2012).  
There has not been a major accident on the NCS since 1985 (Vinnem, Hestad, Kvaløy, 
& Skogdalen, 2010). Regardless of this, work related accidents and deaths, and major 
accident precursors are still occurring in the industry (Petroleum Safety Authority Norway 
[PSA], 2013b). The amount of incidents have declined since the peak year of 2002, which 
might be explained partially by the fact that the oil and gas industry has been through major 
technical, organizational, economic and social changes since the beginning of oil drilling on 
the NCS in 1966.  
Haukelid (1998; 2001) has divided the evolution of the Norwegian oil and gas 
industry into four major phases, starting with a phase where willingness to take risks, 
acceptance of injuries and hard work was part of the culture. This phase, lasting into the 
1980s, is described as “Texas”, and is characterized by poor communication between workers 
and a strict hierarchical organization (Haukelid, 1998). The phases of “Great Change” and 
“Great Systems” during the 1980s and 1990s saw an increased focus on “Norwegianizing” the 
culture and the control systems of the industry. New legislations were passed, and the use of 
safety management systems were introduced. Although these systems meant that a wide range 
of human, organizational and technical efforts were introduced, employees in the industry 
were reluctant to adopt the changes (Haukelid, 2001). Nevertheless, the safety culture in the 
industry was fairly good up until the end of the 1990s, and there was a shared realization that 
working and thinking in a safe manner was the best way to work. The current phase, called 
“the cultural solution”, although beginning with a decline in safety and increase in cutbacks 
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and downsizing, is now characterized by a strong belief that a well-functioning safety culture 
is essential for all actors within the Norwegian oil and gas industry (Haukelid, 2001).  
In order to investigate and monitor the safety on the offshore oil platforms on the 
NCS, the PSA initiated the trends in risk level in the petroleum activity [RNNP] project in 
1999/2000. The purpose of the RNNP project was to measure the effect of Health, Safety and 
Environment [HSE] work in the industry, identify critical HSE areas and increase the 
understanding for potential accident causes and their significance for risk (Tharaldsen, Olsen, 
& Rundmo, 2008). As a part of this project, a survey for measurement of safety climate and 
risk was developed and is now administered biannually amongst workers on the NCS. The 
RNNP survey was developed by analyzing previous research on safety climate and culture, 
and by testing and reviewing other existing dimensions, scales and surveys on safety culture 
and climate (Tharaldsen et al., 2008). The RNNP survey is just one of many methods of data 
collection used by the PSA to assess the safety culture on the NCS. The PSA wishes to assess 
the safety culture of the industry, and a part of this assessment is done by using the RNNP 
survey as a method for assessing the safety climate on the NCS through the belief’s and 
experiences of the employees. The distinction between these concepts is not necessarily 
apparent, which is one of the issues this thesis will discuss. Nevertheless, an improvement of 
the RNNP survey should improve the PSA’s assessment of the safety culture on the NCS.  
A study on the psychometric qualities (i.e. the dimensional structure, statistical 
strength and fit with theory) of the RNNP survey based on data from 2001 and 2003 resulted 
in a five dimensional safety climate structure containing 32 items (Tharaldsen et al., 2008). 
The study expected to confirm dimensions related to the Cooper (2000) model of reciprocal 
safety culture, which is the theoretical basis of the RNNP survey. These dimensions are: 
safety practices, individual safety skills and situational aspects relevant for safety behavior 
(Cooper, 2000; Tharaldsen et al., 2008). A three-dimension solution would be in complete 
accordance with the theoretical basis, but this was not found. Instead, a five-dimensional 
safety climate solution, which included Safety prioritization, Safety management and 
involvement, Safety versus production, Individual motivation and System comprehension 
dimensions, was proposed. These five dimensions were then re-allocated according to the 
theoretical model: The first dimension is related to safety practice, dimension two, three and 
four are somewhat related to situational aspects, and dimension five includes some aspects of 
individual safety skills (Tharaldsen et al., 2008). 
A subsequent study that used RNNP data from 2005, by Høivik, Tharaldsen, Baste 
and Moen (2009), confirmed the dimensional structure proposed by Tharaldsen et al. (2008). 
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In addition to this, it proposed a sixth dimension named Competence, which brought the 
number of items up to 35 (Høivik et al., 2009). No discussion of the relation of the 
dimensional structure and the theoretical basis is offered, but it can be argued that the sixth 
dimension is related to individual safety skills. The overall evaluation of the dimensional 
structure is that it confirms the structure proposed by Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and that it fits 
well with the data (Høivik et al., 2009).  
The total subjects of a sample and the ratio of subjects per item in an analysis have 
been shown to significantly improve the “goodness” of PCA (Osborne & Costello, 2004). 
Thus, the use of a larger sample, which also includes the data from 2001, 2003 and 2005, in 
this thesis should provide more psychometrical robust results, which in turn should provide a 
more theory-fitting dimensional structure.  
Issues relating to the conceptualization, definition, assessment and validity of the 
safety climate and safety culture concepts are still not solved, even though these concepts 
have been in use for more than two decades (Cooper, 2001). These issues form the basis for 
this master thesis and the research question presented below. In order to better understand and 
measure the concept of safety climate, an extensive amount of data from the RNNP survey is 
used to present a new dimensional structure of the concept. The presented structure will be 
compared with Cooper’s (2000) model of safety culture. Issues with the items not included in 
the structure will be discussed, along with theoretical issues tied to the concepts of safety 
climate and safety culture. The goal is to provide a more psychometrical suitable dimensional 
structure for the safety climate concept, as well as addressing some of the apparent issues 
related to the concept, and the consequences these issues might have for the RNNP survey. 
Research Question 
“What is a psychometric and theoretical sound way to measure safety climate?” 
In this thesis, “psychometric sound way” is defined as providing a strong factor 
structure in accordance with existing recommended levels of reliability, factor loadings and 
communalities. “Theoretical sound way” is defined as a dimensional solution that fits well 
with the theoretical basis of the RNNP survey and the safety culture concept. 
Outline of the thesis  
 The theoretical framework of the thesis will start by presenting definitions of safety 
climate and safety culture. A presentation of the theoretical basis for safety climate 
measurement will be followed by some of the recurring findings regarding the dimensional 
structure of safety climate. The theoretical basis of the RNNP survey and for measuring safety 
climate through surveys will mark the end of the theory section of the paper.  
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 The method for data collection and some descriptive information about the data will 
be presented. This will be followed by a description of how factor analysis has been used in 
this thesis, and the criteria that are used. In the analysis chapter, the retained factor solution 
will be presented, as well as the contents and names of the proposed dimension. 
 The discussion will start with assessing the psychometrical quality of the proposed 
dimensional structure, primarily by comparing it with the structures of Tharaldsen et al. 
(2008), and Høivik et al. (2009). The theoretical fitness of the proposed structure will be 
assessed in light of the Cooper (2000) model of safety culture, which is the theoretical basis 
of the RNNP survey. The removed items, the RNNP survey length and recommendations for 
future use of the RNNP survey will be discussed, followed by a general discussion of some of 
the issues concerning the safety climate concept. The thesis will end with a conclusion and 
some recommendations for future investigation of the Hexagonal Safety Climate Structure. 
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Theoretical Framework 
Many researchers have tried to define the concept of safety climate. In fact, there is 
not much of a consensus among researchers and academics within the organizational 
psychology field about what the concept constitutes. Many definitions can be found in the 
psychological literature; in just one review paper an astounding 18 definitions of either safety 
climate or safety culture are presented (Guldenmund, 2000). In order to fully understand the 
concepts of safety climate, it is necessary to describe two different – although somewhat 
similar – concepts: safety climate and safety culture. For clarification purposes, their relative 
position to each other and to other organizational aspects will also be presented. 
Safety Climate or Safety Culture? 
There appears to be some dispute in the psychological literature about the distinction 
between safety culture and safety climate. A definition of safety climate that does not relate to 
the concept of safety culture has yet to be discovered by this author. Because of this, a 
description of safety culture and its relation to safety climate will be presented. 
Safety culture is understood as an enduring and relatively stable subcomponent of an 
organization’s culture (Cox & Cheyne, 2000; Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000; 
Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Tharaldsen et al., 2008; Vinnem, Hestad, Kvaløy, & 
Skogdalen, 2010). Safety climate, on the other hand, is understood as the manifestation of 
safety culture through the beliefs and experiences of the employees in an organization; it is 
either a subcomponent of safety culture (Mearns et al., 2003; Glendon & Stanton, 2000), or a 
reflection of the safety culture (Cox & Flin, 1998; Guldenmund, 2000).  
Safety climate can be defined as the surfacing parts of a safety culture discerned from 
the employees’ perceptions and attitudes of safety at any given time. It is operationalized by 
the use of psychometric surveys, which provide a snapshot of the state of the safety culture 
within an organization (Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000). 
The first time the term safety culture appeared in relation to high risk organizations 
and major accidents was in an International Atomic Energy Agency report from 1988 on the 
Chernobyl nuclear reactor meltdown (Booth & Lee, 1995; Cox & Flin, 1998; Tharaldsen et 
al., 2008). The nuclear industry was an early adopter of the term, which is reflected in the fact 
that the perhaps most widely accepted definition of safety culture is from the Advisory 
Committee for Safety in Nuclear Installations [ACSNI]: “The safety culture of an 
organization is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety management” (ACSNI, 1993, p. 23). 
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Guldenmund (2000) characterizes this definition as being the most explicit because it outlines 
most of the assumed characteristics of safety culture, while adopting a social psychology 
perspective (Cox & Flin, 1998). The safety culture definition quoted above will be used in 
this thesis. 
The Theoretical Basis for Assessment with RNNP 
When researchers want to study organizational culture in general or safety culture in 
particular, they should consider triangulation of research methodologies. Triangulation of 
methodologies is essentially a way of combining different methodological techniques (e.g. 
surveys, interviews and audits) in order to provide a multifaceted view of culture (Cooper, 
2000). Triangulation should be of special importance for researchers which claim to study 
safety culture, because the use of surveys – which is the methodology behind the data in this 
thesis – is just one of many different methods of studying safety culture. The basis for this 
statement is a theoretical framework in which safety climate is viewed as a snapshot of the 
safety culture in an organization, and thus this provides one part of a total assessment of the 
safety culture (Cox & Flin, 1998; Guldenmund, 2000).  
Based on the view of safety climate being a reflection, or manifestation, of safety 
culture, it is possible to use psychometric surveys to measure safety climate in order to 
capture a snapshot of the safety culture in an organization at the time of the assessment (Cox 
& Cheyne, 2000; Flin et al., 2000; Mearns et al., 2003; Vinnem et al., 2010). The RNNP 
survey is an example of the use of a survey to assess the safety climate at a given time. This 
assessment is one subcomponent of the overall assessment of the safety culture, while 
accident and injury data, and safety management system audits are some of the other 
subcomponents the PSA uses for assessment (PSA, 2013a). However, using the premise that 
safety climate reflects safety culture might not be theoretically sound enough, according to 
Cooper (2000). Basing the understanding and investigation of safety culture and safety 
climate on the ACSNI (1993) definition of safety culture constitutes an interactive 
relationship between psychological, behavioral and situational factors (Cooper, 2000): 
 
Individual and group values and attitudes refer to members' perceptions about, and 
attitudes towards, safety goals; patterns of behaviour refer to members' day-to-day 
goal-directed safety behaviour; and the style and proficiency of an organisation's 
health and safety programmes indirectly refer to the presence and quality of 
organisational safety systems to support goal-directed safety behaviour. (p. 118) 
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The main argument Cooper (2000) presents is that the safety culture of an 
organization does not exist in a vacuum; it affects, and is affected by, other processes and 
systems within an organization. The ACSNI (1993) definition has contributed to a narrow 
focus on solely using questionnaire surveys to measure safety climate as a surrogate measure 
of safety culture, and this has led to a loss of a more holistic and multi-faceted understanding 
of the concept of safety culture, according to Cooper (2000). The appropriate way of 
understanding safety culture should be through a model where safety culture is reflected in a 
dynamic reciprocal relationship between the employees’ perceptions about, and attitudes 
towards, the operationalization of organizational goals, their daily goal-directed behavior, and 
the presence and quality of the organization’s systems to support the goal-directed behavior. 
Building on the premise of a dynamic relationship, Cooper (2000) suggests a reciprocal 
model for safety culture based on Bandura’s (1977; 1986) model of social learning theory and 
social cognitive theory. 
 Four arguments are provided for why the reciprocal model based on Bandura’s (1977; 
1986) theories is a suitable framework for analyzing and understanding safety culture: Cooper 
(2000) argues that a) the triangular composition of situational, behavioral and psychological 
elements of the model is a perfect match to the accident causation relationships found in 
several studies; b) the dynamic nature of the model is believed to suit the measurement of 
human and organizational systems that operate in dynamic environments, while at the same 
time accounting for the fact that each element may be influenced either simultaneously or not; 
c) the proposed model provides a triangulation method for multilevel analysis, by offering 
different analytical approaches to the different elements of the model; d) the proposed model 
provides a framework in which a holistic, multi-faceted nature of safety culture can be more 
fully examined (Cooper, 2000).  
Figure 1 provides a visualization of Cooper’s (2000) proposal for a reciprocal model 
for safety culture, which consist of subjective internal psychological factors assessed by 
safety climate questionnaires, observable safety-related behaviors assessed by checklists, and 
objective situational features assessed via safety management system inspections. 
The model of reciprocal safety culture in Figure 1 does not offer any explanation to 
what the contents of each element are. While Figure 1 provides the theoretical basis and 
model for the RNNP survey, Figure 2, retrieved from Cooper (2002), provides an insight the 
expected dimensions that the PCA should present, in order to confirm that the analysis and 
the data matches the theoretical basis of the RNNP survey. The dimensions of Figure 2 are 
reflections of how Cooper (2002) conceptualizes the safety climate concept. In Figure 2, the 
THE HEXAGONAL SAFETY CLIMATE STRUCTURE 
 
 8 
three reciprocal factors of safety climate is presented, and it is this model that forms the 
platform for which assessment of the theoretical fit of the dimensional structure of safety 
climate will be performed. It provides a deeper look into the safety climate construct of Figure 
1, while at the same time offering a suggestion to which factors the safety climate construct of 
the RNNP survey should contain.  
Cox and Cheyne (2000) support the idea that a multiple-perspective, holistic model of 
safety, with different approaches to assessment, is beneficial for the overall understanding of 
safety culture. Cooper’s (2002) reciprocal model of the safety climate construct (Figure 2) 
will be regarded as the theoretical basis for the RNNP survey and assessment of safety 
climate, while the general model of safety culture (Figure 1) provides a framework for the 
development of the RNNP survey and the overall safety culture assessment through multiple 
measurement techniques (PSA, 2001; Tharaldsen et al., 2008). 
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Figure 1, model of reciprocal safety culture (Cooper, 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2, contents of the safety climate construct (Cooper, 2002)  
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Safety Climate Measurement 
The main research method for measuring the safety climate of an organization is 
through questionnaires, which should be completed by sufficient employees to enable 
generalization and dimension reduction analysis; a sample size of more than 1000 is 
characterized as “excellent” when performing dimension reduction analysis (Glendon & 
Stanton, 2000; Osborne & Costello, 2004). Several tools for measurement of safety climate 
have been developed, both for the offshore oil industry and for other high-reliability 
industries such as the nuclear and aviation industry. Although these questionnaires differ in 
content and length, they are – in general – comprised of a series of items designed to measure 
participants’ beliefs, values, perceptions and attitudes towards various statements which relate 
to specific dimensions thought to be important for safety (Mearns et al., 2003). The 
questionnaires are used to survey individuals within organizations, and scores are then often 
aggregated to a group or organizational level in order to provide insight into the overall safety 
climate (Cooper, 2000). The dimensional structure in the data is then used to give insight into 
correlations between dimensions and how the dimensions interact with other variables such as 
accident rates or amount of safety training given (Flin et al., 2000). 
Dimensional Structure of Safety Climate 
 As we have seen in Figure 1, the theoretical basis for the safety climate construct in 
the RNNP survey is that it consists of subjective internal psychological factors. This premise 
enables assessment through questionnaires. By operationalizing safety climate as the 
manifestation of safety culture through the expressed attitudes and behaviors of employees, 
researchers have been able to develop several scales for which to measure safety climate 
(Mearns et al., 2003). Although safety climate has been characterized as multi-dimensional, 
the number of dimensions remains disputed (Guldenmund, 2000; Mearns et al., 2003; 
Tharaldsen et al., 2008). According to Guldenmund (2000), one of the issues regarding 
dimensionality is that researchers can name their dimensions as they see fit. This complicates 
comparative analyses. Most of the studies reviewed by Guldenmund (2000) were exploratory, 
which means that there is little cohesion between the number of dimensions and the names of 
these; the number of dimensions in the studies reviewed range from two to 16. These 
differences in the underlying dimensional structure may also reflect methodological 
differences, according to Tharaldsen et al. (2008). 
 Although the dimensional structure of safety climate is a disputed and unsettled issue, 
some of the recurring dimensional findings in several studies are related to management 
commitment to safety, supervisor competence, priority of safety over production, time 
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pressure and colleague involvement (Mearns et al., 2003; Tharaldsen et al., 2008). In a review 
paper on human factors in the offshore oil industry, Gordon (1998), found that management 
commitment to safety, safety training, open communication, environmental control and a 
positive safety promotion policy were factors which affected safety climate on an 
organizational level.  
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Method and Data 
This thesis is not based on self-collected data. Instead it relies on previously collected 
data from the RNNP survey. A presentation of the design process of the RNNP survey, what 
the survey consists of and how it is administered will be given.  
The PSA initiated the RNNP in 1999/2000 as a tool for measuring and illustrating the 
development in risk level on the NCS. The RNNP tool was developed in order to measure 
both personal risks amongst employees, as well as the risks for abrupt oil or gas spills on the 
NCS. The RNNP survey is conducted every other year, and the results are presented in annual 
reports (PSA, 2013a). 
 The RNNP began as a pilot project where the main objectives were to keep records of 
unwanted events, measure the effect of the safety work in the industry, focus on the industry’s 
own follow-up of trends and analyses, contribute to identifying critical areas for the safety on 
the NCS, and to increase the insight on possible explanations of accidents. Furthermore, the 
pilot project intended to develop and test a model for analysis and assessments of the 
development of the risk level on the NCS (PSA, 2001). 
Developing the RNNP Survey 
 The PSA decided that it was highly necessary to include both quantitative and 
qualitative analyses in order to assess the safety level in a broader way. Initially, it was 
decided to register and analyze quantitative data, which was supplemented with qualitative 
data of less measureable factors such as attitudes, culture and perceived risk. The qualitative 
data was collected through interviews, and the data was then used as a basis for the 
development of a survey (PSA, 2001). It was argued that this data triangulation would help 
increase the understanding of organizational, cultural and behavioral factors related to, or 
associated with, accidents in high-risk organizations (PSA, 2001).  
Initially a total of 16 qualitative interviews were conducted with different key 
informants and actors within and surrounding the Norwegian oil and gas industry. Several of 
the informants agreed that an extensive survey should be conducted every other year – 
although it was also pointed out that such a survey was dependent on relevant and concrete 
survey questions and items (PSA, 2001).  
Several problem areas were pointed out during the qualitative interviews, and one of 
these areas was the safety culture concept and the different ways of understanding what a 
“good” safety culture constituted. Based on this, the three main areas of interest for the 
quantitative survey were safety culture, perceived risk and safety attitudes amongst the 
respondents (PSA, 2001). The project group identified three main weaknesses within the 
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existing literature on the measurement of safety culture, perceived risk and safety attitudes. 
These were: the conceptual confusions of the dimensions and concepts of the surveys, the 
lack of focus on behavior, and the uncertainty of the predictive validity of the existing surveys 
(PSA, 2001). In an attempt to cope with these issues, it was decided to base the RNNP survey 
on the reciprocal safety culture model proposed by Cooper (2000).  
The Structure of the RNNP Survey 
Basing the theoretical foundation of the survey on social learning theory allowed for 
structuring the RNNP survey around four main focus areas; Behavior, Person, Situation and 
Risk Experiences (PSA, 2001). In addition to these areas, demographical and HSE item 
batteries were included in the survey. The survey is 10 pages long, consisting of 50 questions 
and a total of 111 items, as well as demographical items. A copy of the RNNP survey can be 
found in Appendix A, and the 52 items concerning safety climate can be found under question 
29 in the survey. All of the safety climate items are statements (e.g. “Safety is my number one 
priority when I work”) where the person answering them must indicate on a Likert scale 
whether they fully agree (1) or fully disagree (5) with each statement. McIver and Carmines 
(1981) states that a Likert scale should be composed of a fairly equal number of positive and 
negative items concerning the construct in question, and that the responses of these items 
should be calculated in a way that individuals with the most favorable responses have the 
highest scores, and vice versa. Consequently, the RNNP survey meets former requirement for 
Likert scales, but not the latter. 
In accordance with Cooper’s (2000) model for reciprocal safety culture, the RNNP 
consists of items concerning safety practices, individual safety skills and experience and 
situational aspects related to safety behavior. Safety practices are related to daily safety 
prioritization and risk communication, individual safety skills and experience are concerned 
with role clarity, competence and safety training, while the situational aspects are divided into 
factors that influences behavior and consequences of actions (Tharaldsen et al., 2008). 
RNNP Participants 
 The questionnaire part of RNNP has been used to collect data biannually on the NCS 
since 2001, when a selection of employees on the NCS was included as participants (PSA, 
2013c). In 2003 the questionnaire was administered to all offshore employees on the NCS, 
and since 2005 it has also been administered to onshore employees in the Norwegian oil and 
gas industry (PSA, 2013c). The data used in this thesis is from offshore employees only, after 
being filtered by the PSA upon request. The response rate on the questionnaire has been 
between 30 % and 55 % throughout the years since 2001 (PSA, 2013c).  
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The data provided from PSA consists of a total of 51803 respondents, in which 89,1 % 
are men and 9,1 % are women. 1,9 %, approximately 1000 respondents, have not provided 
information about their sex. Respondents are employees working in the oil and gas industry 
on the NCS. Professions vary in a wide range; chefs, electricians, health workers, engineers, 
welders, priests and helicopter pilots are just some of the professions represented in the data. 
The five largest groups of employees are process and management technicians, roustabout 
pushers, electricians, mechanics and engineers – representing approximately 16000 of the 
respondents. Almost 9 out of 10 (89 %) respondents are Norwegian, while Danish (3,4 %), 
British (2,8 %) and Swedish (2,5 %) respondents are the three largest foreign groups. More 
than 40 nationalities are represented in the data material. 
Roughly 7 out of 10 (71,8 %) are classified as reporting that they work on a 
production unit, while 28,2 % are classified as working on a mobile installation. Only 3,7 % 
of respondents are temporarily employed, while the rest are permanent employees.  
Factor Analysis – PCA 
 The main purpose of this study is to propose a new dimensional structure for safety 
climate, based on the data provided by the PSA. Because safety climate cannot be measured 
directly – it consists of many dimensions, or factors – one way of analyzing the underlying 
structure of the variables that are meant to measure safety climate is by using a factorial 
analysis technique to identify these underlying structures (Jolliffe, 2002, Schmitt, 2012). The 
central idea behind PCA is to reduce the dimensionality of a data set containing a large 
number of interrelated variables, while in the same time retaining as much of the variation in 
the data as possible (Jolliffe, 2002). Since this master’s thesis paper is built upon data 
exploration – and because there is no need for generalization beyond the data itself – it was 
decided that initial exploratory factor analysis through principal component analysis [PCA] – 
followed by additional PC analyses – was the best factorial technique.  
 PCA is a statistical procedure for testing whether groups of items can be separated by 
linear combinations of dependent variables (Shlens, 2014). In PCA, the overall correlation 
matrix of variables is used to calculate the variates, and the total amount of variates that is 
calculated will always equal the number of variables in the data (Abdi & Williams, 2010). In 
a PCA, the variates are described by eigenvectors, which in turn is weighted by eigenvalues. 
The eigenvalues represent the importance of each variate, and the basic idea of PCA is to 
retain factors with large eigenvalues, and ignore factors with small eigenvalues (Abdi & 
Williams, 2010).  
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The process of deciding which factors to retain is called extraction, and this is either 
done by observing a scree plot or by retaining all factors with an eigenvalue larger than 1, or 
larger than 0,7 – depending on whether the scientist uses the Kaiser’s criterion or 
recommendations made by Jolliffe (Beavers, Lounsbury, Richards, Huck, Skolits, & 
Esquivel, 2013). This thesis uses IBM SPSS to analyze the data, and the default setting in 
SPSS is to use Kaiser’s criterion to extract factors (Field, 2013). Because of this, a 
combination of scree plots and subsequent analysis with a specified number of factors has 
been used to determine the appropriate number of factors. 
According to Costello and Osborne (2005) a good rule of thumb for the minimum 
factor loading of an item is .32. Both previous studies provided dimensional structures where 
factor loadings were either barely above this threshold or very much below it (Tharaldsen et 
al., 2008; Høivik et al., 2009). Neither study reports any multifactorial loading of items, even 
though it is recommended that items loading at .32 or higher on two to more factors should be 
considered dropped (Costello & Osborne, 2005). Likewise, neither study confirmed a three-
dimensional structure that was in complete accordance to Cooper’s (2000) model – i.e. 
retaining a three-factor structure. In addition to this, the size of the data material is 
substantially larger in this thesis than in both studies. 
Cronbach’s α is the most widely used measure of reliability (Peterson & Kim, 2013). 
The measure was developed by Cronbach (1951) in order to express the internal consistency 
of a test or a scale as a number between zero and one. The internal consistency of items in a 
scale describes whether the items measure the same construct (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). 
According to Cronbcach (1951), no factor analysis would be interpretable without an estimate 
of the reliability of the measurement. When performing a factor analysis, it is generally 
advised to report Cronbach’s α for each of the retained factors. This is because Cronbach’s α 
assumes that each item of a test measures the same trait on the same scale, and this 
assumption is violated when more than one factor is proposed for a concept – which leads to 
Cronbach’s α underestimating the reliability of the test (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). Different 
views of the acceptable value of Cronbach’s α exist within the literature, but as a rule of 
thumb, Cronbach’s α should be within .70 (Beavers et al., 2013; Peterson & Kim, 2013; 
Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). 
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Analysis 
 Initially, a total of 52 items were chosen for analysis. These items were chosen 
through a theoretical assessment, and because of their possible relevance for the concept of 
safety climate.  
Analytical Process 
The analysis began with an exploratory factor analysis, which resulted in an eight-
factor solution that explained 47,5% of total variance. The solution was rotated by the use of 
the orthogonal rotation method varimax, and Kaiser’s criterion of an eigenvalue > 1 was 
applied to determine the number of factors to retain. The resulting solution suggested that 
factor 1 and 2 should contain 18 and 12 items, respectively, while the remaining 22 items 
were fairly equally divided among the remaining six factors. This was expected, because PCA 
will aim to explain as much as the variance in the data as possible with as few factors as 
possible, as well as explaining as much as possible with the first factor(s) (Beavers et al., 
2013; Field, 2013). 
 The exploratory factor analysis showed that factor 9 had an eigenvalue of .99, and 
therefore a forced nine-factor solution was tested. This increased the total explained variance 
to 49,4 %, but issues with multi-factorial and low loadings among several item, as well as 
theoretical issues with the retained factors meant that items had to be eliminated. 
  By using extracted communalities, factor loadings, theoretical assessments of 
proposed factor structures, and total explained variance as criteria, items were removed one 
by one and a new PCA was conducted after removal of each item. This process required 
precision and thorough assessments of the factor solutions. An overview of removed items 
and the reason for removal is presented, in order of removal, in Appendix B. Eventually, a 
PCA with 30 items, presented in Table 1, proposed a six-factor solution, which provided few 
items with loadings above .300 for more than one factor and sufficient factor loadings. The 
proposed solution in Table 1, obtained through PCA with orthogonal varimax rotation, 
explains 53,1 % of the total variance, while also meeting Kaiser’s criterion for eigenvalues > 
1. 
THE HEXAGONAL SAFETY CLIMATE STRUCTURE 
 
 18 
 
Table 1 
Factors and loadings, six factor solution 
Items Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1) My manager appreciates me pointing out matters of 
importance to HSE .63    .41  
2) Being to preoccupied with HSE can be a disadvantage to 
your career - .62      
3) My supervisor is committed to the HSE work on the facility .61      
4) The company I work for takes HSE seriously .60      
5) The management takes input from the safety delegates 
seriously .58     .40 
6) I would rather not discuss HSE with my immediate 
supervisor - .57      
7) I can influence the HSE matters at my workplace .57      
8) My colleagues are very committed to HSE .44   .34   
9) I have easy access to procedures and instructions concerning 
my work  .75     
10) I think it is easy to find what I need in the governing 
documents (requirements and procedures)  .74     
11) The HSE procedures cover my work tasks  .63     
12) I always know who to report to in the organisation  .62     
13) I have access to the information necessary to make 
decisions which ensure the HSE aspect  .60     
14) The equipment I need to carry out my work safely is easily 
available  .45     
15) Dangerous situations arise because everyone does not 
speak the same language   .65    
16) There are often concurrent work operations which lead to 
dangerous situations   .63    
17) Deficient maintenance has caused poorer safety   .62    
18) Different procedures and routines at different facilities may 
pose a threat to safety   .61    
19) Lack of cooperation between operators and contractors 
often lead to dangerous situations   .60    
20) Reports about accidents or dangerous situations are often 
“embellished” -.41  .53    
21) I report any dangerous situations I see    .72   
22) Safety is my number one priority when I work    .70   
23) I ask my colleagues to stop work which I believe is 
performed in an unsafe manner    .66   
24) I stop work if I believe that it may be dangerous for me or 
others to continue    .48 .37  
25) I sometimes breach safety rules in order to get a job 
quickly done    -.44   
26) My colleagues will stop me if I work unsafely    .39 .47  
27) I have been given adequate safety training     .74  
28) I have been given adequate working environment training     .72  
29) I have the necessary competence to perform my job in a 
safe manner      .82 
30) I am thoroughly familiar with the HSE procedures      .74 
Note. Items translated from Norwegian by the PSA       
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Dimensional Structure 
 Before naming the dimensions of the six-factor solution, decisions regarding the 
placement of items #1, #5, #8, #20, #24 and #26 had to be made. These items were placed 
either with the factor they loaded most towards, or with the factor which overall theme was 
most appropriate. Items #1, #5 and #8 were placed with factor 1, item #20 was placed with 
factor 3 and item #24 was placed with factor 4 because of their loadings with these factors. In 
the case of item #26, placed with factor 4, the factor loading criteria was discarded as main 
criteria in favor of a theoretically more robust factor 4.  
 Supportive safety culture. Dimension 1, comprising of eight items reflecting a 
supportive culture of safety among the leadership, colleagues and in a personal sense (e.g. 
“The management takes input from the safety delegates seriously”), was given the name 
Supportive safety culture. Items #2 and #6 show a negative loading, which is explained by 
their inverted wording. Because the statements are answered with a Likert scale where 1 
indicates fully agreeing and 5 indicates fully disagreeing, it should be expected that scores on 
these two items are closer to 5 while scores on the remaining six items are closer to 1 – or 
vice versa. In order to test the reliability, items #2 and #6 were reversed, and the resulting 
Cronbach’s α was .82, which is above acceptable level of .70 (Beavers et al., 2013). 
 Procedures and guidelines. Dimension 2, containing six items reflecting employees 
experience with, and access to, safety procedures and HSE documents (e.g. “I have easy 
access to procedures and instructions concerning my work”), was named Procedures and 
guidelines. Cronbach’s α was .82, the same as with dimension 1. 
 Absence of hazards. Dimension 3 consists of negatively worded statements. In order 
to simplify interpretation and comparison with the other dimension, the items in this 
dimension was reversed. Due to reversing the items, the dimension was given the name 
Absence of hazards. The six items of this dimension are concerned with organizational and 
day-to-day issues that have a negative effect on the safety of employees and/or the workplace 
(e.g. “There are often concurrent work operations which lead to dangerous situations”), which 
means that scoring low on this dimension indicate an absence of hazards. Cronbach’s α was 
.73, somewhat lower than dimension 1 and 3, but still acceptable. 
 Safe behavior. Dimension 4, also comprising of six items, reflects respondents 
willingness to overrule work operations and report safety issues, and their belief that 
colleagues will do the same (e.g. “I stop work if I believe that it may be dangerous for me or 
others to continue”). The dimension was named Safe behavior, and it contains one item (#25), 
which is negatively phrased. This item loads negatively on the dimension, which is expected. 
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The reliability of the dimension is .69, barely below the recommended level of .70 (Beavers et 
al., 2013). 
Training and Competence. Dimension 5, named Training, consists of two items 
regarding personnel training in safety and in working environment. It has a Cronbach’s α of 
.76. Dimension 6, consisting of two dimensions regarding perceived personal competence, 
was named Competence, and has a Cronbach’s α of .69. Table 2 provides an overview of the 
mean score, standard deviation and variance of the dimensions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The mean of the six proposed dimensions is relatively low, ranging from 1.47 to 2.64. These 
dimensions are comprised of items, which – if scored low – indicate a positive safety culture. 
The third dimension, Absence of hazards, represents negative organizational or day-to-day 
issues, but because it is reversed a low mean score will represent a positive employee rating 
of the prevalence of hazards. This seems counter intuitive, but it is a product of the scoring of 
the responses of the items, where a high number will indicate a disagreement with the 
statement of the item.  
 
  
Table 2 
Self reported assessment of safety climate, 2001 - 2003 
Safety climate dimensions  
Dimension label Mean Standard deviation Variance 
1. Supportive safety culture 2.31 .39 .16 
2. Procedures and guidelines 1.96 .72 .52 
3. Absence of hazards (REV) 2.64 .82 .67 
4. Safe behavior 1.85 .37 .14 
5. Training 1.72 .77 .59 
6. Competence 1.47 .65 .43 
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Discussion 
The research question in focus was: What is a psychometric and theoretical sound way 
to measure safety climate? In order to answer this, exploratory factor analysis and principal 
component analysis was used to reveal the underlying dimensional structure of the safety 
climate data from the RNNP survey. The theoretical basis for the concepts of safety culture 
and safety climate has been presented. Through theoretical and analytical assessment, items 
were removed gradually. The result is a six-dimensional structure containing 30 items with 
strong reliability and factor loadings above recommended levels.  
In order to assess how psychometrically sound the proposed structure is, the 
discussion will start by comparing the proposed dimensional structure with previous 
psychometric studies of the RNNP survey and their proposed dimensional structure. 
Furthermore, the model of reciprocal safety culture proposed by Cooper (2000) will be 
compared with the six-dimensional structure of this thesis, in order to assess how theoretically 
sound the proposed structure is. The removed items (Appendix B), the length of the RNNP 
survey, the use of surveys for assessing safety culture and climate, and recommendations 
regarding future use of the survey will be discussed. Some essential issues with the theoretical 
basis for the RNNP survey will be addressed, followed by a conclusion where implications 
for future research on the safety climate concept will be presented.  
The main research method for measuring the safety climate of an organization is 
through questionnaires, and samples of more than 500 is considered “good” when conducting 
factor analysis (Glendon & Stanton, 2000). Several tools for measurement of safety climate 
have been developed, both for the offshore oil industry and for other high-reliability 
industries such as the nuclear and aviation industry. Although safety culture and safety 
climate have been in focus in high-risk organizations in general, and the NCS in particular, 
for more than two decades (Haukelid, 2001), no unified dimensional structure of safety 
climate exists and the exact number of dimensions that make up safety climate remains in 
dispute (Guldenmund, 2000; Mearns et al., 2003; Tharaldsen et al., 2008). Some of the 
recurring dimensions from previous research are management commitment to safety, priority 
of safety over production, colleague involvement and open communication (Gordon, 1998; 
Mearns et al., 2003; Tharaldsen et al., 2008).  
Psychometric properties of the Dimensional Structure 
 Tharaldsen et al. (2008) performed a psychometric study of the RNNP survey based 
on data from 2001 and 2003. A subsequent study by Høivik et al. (2009) confirmed, and 
developed, the dimensional structure proposed by Tharaldsen et al. (2008) by using data from 
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2005. Even though these two studies propose a fairly similar dimensional structure, they will 
be discussed separately. This is because they have used different data, and in such present 
some different results when it comes to factor loadings and reliability. The proposed 
dimensional structure, named The Hexagonal Safety Climate Structure, differs substantially 
from the dimensional structure proposed by Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009) 
in terms of reliability, size of the dimensions and factorial loadings. 
Unfortunately, because the item contents of the dimensions differ, a direct comparison 
of dimensions will not make sense. Instead, the comparison will focus on clarifying the 
differences between the proposed dimensions of this thesis and the dimensions that are most 
similar in the Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009) studies, and an attempt to 
clarify the differences will be made. The comparison will use the proposed dimensions of this 
thesis as a reference. 
Supportive safety culture. Dimension 1 of the Hexagonal Safety Climate Structure 
shares six of its items with the Safety management and involvement dimension of Tharaldsen 
et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009). Item #1 in Table 1 is missing from the dimensional 
structure of Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009). The reason for why this 
particular item is missing is unknown, but it is likely that it was removed because of 
psychometric or theoretical reasons. Furthermore, items #4 and #7 - #11 in the Safety 
management and involvement dimension of Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al (2009) 
were removed from the analysis in this thesis because of extracted communalities below .40 
(items #7 and #9) and multifactorial loadings above, or close to, .32 (items #4, #8, #10 and 
#11). This is in accordance with the recommendations that items which load either below .32 
on a factor, or which loads .32 or higher on two or more factors should be considered dropped 
from the analysis (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Gaskin & Happell, 2014. More accurate factor 
solutions are achieved with communalities above .41, thus items with communalities less than 
.40 should be considered dropped (Gaskin & Happell, 2014). At the same time, items #1, #5 
and #8 of the Supportive safety culture dimension have multifactorial loadings above .32 
(Table 1). This might indicate that the proposed dimension is unsuited for the data, or that the 
items are poorly written. All three items concerned might have been removed, but because the 
sample size of the data is vastly larger than in the previous studies, it was decided to keep 
them. 
Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009) did not report whether items had 
multifactorial loadings or not. Nevertheless, it is not unlikely that the items included in the 
Safety management and involvement dimension of the aforementioned studies in fact do 
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show multifactorial loadings and/or have low communalities, because these were the reasons 
for dropping them in the analysis in this thesis. The essence of the Safety management and 
involvement dimension, management’s prioritization of safety and employees’ feelings 
regarding involvement and influence (Tharaldsen et al., 2008), is equal to the essence of the 
Supportive safety culture dimension proposed in this thesis. 
Furthermore, the reliability of the dimensions is fairly equal: Tharaldsen et al. (2008) 
reported Cronbach’s α of .85 in data from 2001 and 2003, Høivik et al. (2009) reported 
Cronbach’s α of .84, and Cronbach’s α of dimension 1 in this thesis is .82. This suggests that 
the reliability of the dimensions is equally good. But, as Field (2013) writes, when the number 
of items in a factor increases, the α of the factor will increase. This means that a high α might 
reflect a large number of items, and not an internal consistent factor. This is exemplified by 
Cortina (1993), which shows that a scale with α = .80 will have an average item correlation of 
.57 if it contains three items, but average item correlation drops to .28 when the scale contains 
10 items. In conclusion, the reliability, potential multifactorial loadings and communality of 
the items in the Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009) dimension Safety 
management and involvement can be questioned. The proposed dimension 1 of this thesis 
conserve the essence of the aforementioned dimension, and in the same time maintains a high 
reliability with fewer items. It does however include three items with multifactorial loadings 
above .32. In spite of this, the totality of arguments in favor of the proposed dimension 1 of 
this thesis suggest it is a better dimension than the corresponding dimension in the studies of 
Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009). 
Procedures and guidelines. The second dimension of the Hexagonal Safety Climate 
Structure shares three items with the System comprehension dimension of the Tharaldsen et 
al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009) studies. In the Tharaldsen et al. (2008) study, the 
dimension contains four items, while in the Høivik et al. (2009) study it contains three items. 
None of the items in either of the abovementioned dimensions include items with 
multifactorial loadings, and all of the items appear to load sufficiently on their dimensions. 
Item #13 and #14 in Table 1 are not included in the proposed dimensional structure of 
either Tharaldsen et al. (2008) or Høivik et al. (2009). The reason behind this is unknown, 
since neither demonstrates low communalities or low, or multifactorial, loadings in the 
proposed dimensional structure of this thesis. The reliability of the proposed dimension of this 
thesis differs quite a lot from the reliability reported by Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et 
al (2009). Cronbach’s α is .82 for the proposed dimension, while Tharaldsen et al. (2009) 
reports Cronbach’s α of .67 for both 2001 and 2003 data, and Høivik et al. (2009) reports 
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Cronbach’s α of .65. The opposite of what was discussed for dimension 1 may be happening 
with dimension 2: Due to the fact that dimension 2 of this thesis has six items, its reliability 
might be inflated in a way that does not happen with the corresponding dimension of the 
Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009) studies.  
The essence of the proposed dimension 2 in this thesis is the same as the essence of 
the System comprehension dimension. The intention of both dimensions is to measure 
employees’ experience with and understanding of safety related procedures and documents. It 
is not necessarily straightforward defining which of the dimensions fits better to the data 
provided, although the proposed dimension does contain more items related to safety 
procedures than the corresponding dimension in the Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. 
(2009) studies. 
Absence of hazards. The proposed dimension 3 of this thesis corresponds to the 
Safety versus production dimension of Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009). Item 
#2 of the Safety versus production dimension has been removed from the analysis in this 
thesis because of multifactorial loadings. At the time of removal, it had a loading of -.47, .39 
and .35 on three different factors, and its strongest loading was on the factor that eventually 
became the Supportive safety culture dimension of this thesis. The sum of these issues led to 
it being removed. 
Item #20 in Table 1, “Reports about accidents or dangerous situations are often 
“embellished””, loads towards both factor one (-.41) and factor three (.53) in the factor 
solution. This indicates that the item could have been dropped from the analysis (Costello & 
Osborne, 2005), although its theoretical importance was deemed more important, partially 
because the reliability of the dimension would have dropped from Cronbach’s α = .73 to 
Cronbach’s α = .68 if the item was removed. Removing the item would have seen the 
reliability dropping below the levels of Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009), 
which reported Cronbach’s α of .70 for 2001 data, .73 for 2003 data and .74 for 2005 data. 
However, this particular item is also part of the Safety versus production dimension of 
Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009), which supports the decision of keeping the 
item. 
As was the case with dimension 2, the essence of this dimension is equal to the Safety 
versus production dimension of Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009). They all 
have in common that they reflect framework conditions and day-to-day issues that have a 
negative effect on the safety of employees and/or the organization. The proposed dimension 
of this thesis contains three items (#15, #18 and #19) that are not part of the dimensional 
THE HEXAGONAL SAFETY CLIMATE STRUCTURE 
 
 25 
structure of Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009). The reason behind not including 
these is unknown, although it can be speculated that these items did not have sufficient factor 
loading, or they might have shown multifactorial loadings in the previous studies. In the case 
of this thesis, the items in question show loadings of .65, .63 and .60, respectively, which is 
considered as strong loadings (Costello & Osborne, 2005). 
Safe behavior. The proposed dimension 4, consisting of items #21 - #26 in Table 1, 
can be compared with the Individual motivation dimension of Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and 
Høivik et al. (2009). They do differ to some extent, mainly because item #25 and #26 of 
Table 1 is not part of the corresponding dimension of Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et 
al. (2009). Item #25 is part of the Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009) dimension 
named Safety prioritization, while item #26 has been removed in their studies. It is likely that 
item #26 was removed because of multifactorial loading, since this is the case in the factor 
solution of this master thesis. The item has a loading of -.39 on factor four and .47 on factor 5. 
The item was placed in dimension four because of its theoretical meaning and because it fitted 
better there than in dimension five. The item “I use personal protective equipment”, which is 
part of the Individual motivation dimension of Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. 
(2009) was removed from the RNNP survey before data collection in 2013 (PSA, 2013a), 
thus it was not part of the analysis in this thesis.  
Item #24 in Table 1 is multifactorial; it has loadings of .48 on factor four and .37 on 
factor five. This is higher than recommended by Costello and Osborne (2005), but it was 
decided to keep the item and incorporate it into dimension four because of its relevance for 
the dimension. The item loading is much higher in the analysis of this thesis than in the 
Høivik et al. (2009) study (.28) – but not very much different from the Tharaldsen et al. 
(2008) study, where loadings of .44 and .39 was reported from the 2001 and 2003 data, 
respectively. 
The reliability of the proposed dimension, measured by a Cronbach’s α of .69, is close 
to the reported reliability of both Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009), which is 
.67, .67 and .68 for the data from 2001, 2003 and 2005, respectively. Because the Safe 
behavior dimension proposed in this thesis contains six items, and the corresponding 
dimensions in previous studies contain five, it can be argued that the proposed dimension is 
not a better measure than the existing dimension of previous studies – due to the fact that an 
increase in items will inflate the reliability of a factor (Field, 2013). 
Training. This dimension consists of items #28 and #29 in Table 1. It has no direct 
correspondence with any of the dimensions of the Tharaldsen et al. (2008) study, but it does 
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correspond to the Competence dimension of the Høivik et al. (2009) study. The Competence 
dimension proposed by Høivik et al. (2009) has a lower reliability (Cronbach’s α = .72) than 
the Training dimension of this thesis (Cronbach’s α = .76), as well as lower factor loadings 
for the two items in question. Høivik et al. (2009) report factor loadings of .61 and .53, while 
the factor loadings of the items in the Training dimension are .74 and .71. 
Competence. This dimension consists of items #29 and #30, and has a Cronbach’s α 
of .69. It does not correspond to any of the dimensions in the Tharaldsen et al. (2008) or 
Høivik et al. (2009) studies.  
 When viewed in total, it appears that dimension one and two are, psychometrically 
and theoretically, more fitting for the data than their corresponding dimensions in the 
Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009) studies. Dimension three and four might not 
be more psychometrically fitting, but in a theoretical light it is possible to say that they are 
better because they include more items regarding the overall concept they are said to reflect, 
while at the same time maintaining the psychometric strength. It is harder to determine 
whether dimension five and six fits better to the data. On one hand, dimension five is more 
psychometrically fitting, both in terms of reliability and factor loadings. On the other hand, 
neither one corresponds particularly well to any of the dimensions in the Tharaldsen et al. 
(2008) or Høivik et al. (2009) studies. At the same time, dimensions containing less than three 
items are generally regarded as both weak and unstable (Costello and Osborne, 2005), which 
disfavors dimension five and six. An attempt at counteracting this was made by measuring the 
Cronbach’s α of a combined dimension five and six, which resulted in Cronbach’s α of .75. If 
the four items of these two dimensions were forced together through a fixed five-factor 
solution, they would have loadings of .69 (#27), .66 (#28), .66 (#29) and .61 (#30). A solution 
could have been to use a forced five-factor solution, although this would have affected the 
other factor loadings in a negative way, as well as reducing the explained variance of the 
solution to 49,6 %. 
 The proposed structure is equally, though most likely more psychometrically fit for 
measuring the safety climate dimensional structure than the previous structures proposed by 
Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009). It is most likely more psychometrically fit, 
due to the fact that it proposes a more even distribution of items across dimensions, it shows 
strong factor loadings and reliability across the dimensions and it explains more than 53 % of 
the variance in the data. Even though the proposed solution contains six items with 
multifactorial loadings, this is less than what is believed to be the case with the solutions of 
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Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009), which includes 10 items that have showed 
multifactorial loadings in the analysis of this thesis. 
Cooper’s Reciprocal Model of Safety Culture 
 The reciprocal model of safety culture proposed by Cooper (2000) provides the 
framework for the RNNP survey (Tharaldsen et al., 2008; PSA, 2001). The main focus of 
Cooper (2000) is that the links between personal, behavioral and situational aspects of safety 
needs to be empirically investigated because these links are reciprocal. When developing the 
RNNP survey, it was important that the final instrument contained items that addressed safety 
practices, individual safety skills and experience, and situational aspects relevant for safety 
behavior (Tharaldsen et al., 2008). In spite of basing the RNNP survey on a theoretical model 
that contained three dimensions, a three-dimensional solution in accordance with the model 
was not found (Tharaldsen et al., 2008).  
 Cooper (2000) is concerned with defining an outcome measure of safety culture, 
because this might aid in determining whether an organization has a “good” or a “bad” safety 
culture. Cooper uses the ACSNI definition of safety culture as a basis, and stresses the 
importance of conceptualizing the “product” of the definition. Cooper (2000, p. 115) suggests 
defining the product as “That observable degree of effort with which all organisational (sic) 
members direct their attention and actions towards improving safety on a daily basis”. This 
definition of the product provides a tangible outcome measure which is possible to measure – 
for instance through surveys. 
When determining whether the proposed dimensional structure of this thesis fits 
Cooper’s model of safety culture, one has to compare the concepts of the proposed 
dimensions with the elements of the model. First of all, a three-dimensional structure was not 
obtained, which is consistent with Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009). Figure 2 
provides an overview of the proposed contents of each element of the safety climate 
construct. As seen in Figure 2, the content of the three elements of safety climate is quite 
broad. This is practical when assessing the fit of a dimensional structure, but it also highlights 
the theoretical and empirical complexity of the safety climate concept. It is hard to imagine a 
dimensional structure of safety climate that would not fit within the reciprocal model of safety 
culture, simply because the elements of safety climate are so universal. 
 Regardless of this, an assessment of the fit of the Hexagonal Safety Climate Structure 
with Cooper’s reciprocal model of safety climate (2002) should be made. The following is 
considered as appropriate: It is proposed that Dimension 1 “Supportive safety culture” fits 
with the Organization construct (Figure 2). Dimension 2 “Procedures and guidelines” fits 
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within the Job construct. Dimension 3 “Absence of hazards” fits within both the Organization 
and the Job construct, although it seems to be more in compliance with the Job construct. 
Dimension 4 “Safe behavior”, Dimension 5 “Training” and Dimension 6 “Competence” fit 
with the Person construct of Figure 2. The assessment shows that the proposed dimensional 
structure of this thesis fits well with the theoretical basis of the RNNP survey. Although, one 
might question whether it is an issue that the Organization construct of safety climate seems 
to be less represented than the Person and Job constructs in the proposed dimensional 
structure. It is important to note that the items of the proposed “Supportive safety culture” 
dimension covers most of the topics mentioned by Cooper (2002) in the Organization 
construct of safety climate. This, in combination with other safety assessment methods used 
by the PSA, indicates that the construct is sufficiently represented by the dimensional 
structure presented in this thesis. 
Another issue that is relevant is the fact that the proposed dimensional structure does 
not contain a specific dimension focusing on communication. Yet, four of the six dimensions 
contain items that are related to, or directly concerned with, communication. Communication 
permeates the dimensional structure, which points to communication being essential both for 
employee participation, management commitment to safety and employee responsibility to 
take action. This is true also for the dimensional structure proposed by both Tharaldsen et al. 
(2008) and Høivik et al. (2009).  
The Removed Items 
 A total of 22 of the 52 items of the RNNP survey that appears to relate to safety 
climate, were removed (Appendix B) from analysis during the PCA. This was either due to 
psychometric issues such as low communality or multifactorial loadings, or due to theoretical 
assessments related to the “fit” of the item within the factor solution. In the case of the 
Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009) studies, 20 and 17 items, respectively, where 
removed from the dimensional structure. 
 Although many items were removed, this does not mean that the items in question are 
unimportant for measuring the safety climate amongst employees in the Norwegian oil and 
gas industry. Tharaldsen et al. (2008) do not discuss the implication of removing items from 
the analysis, and Høivik et al. (2009) appear to have chosen only the 35 items of the RNNP 
survey that was relevant for their study. Most, if not all, of the removed items in Appendix B 
should provide important information regarding employee perception of the safety climate. 
The items are concerned with areas such as attitudes towards safety, management 
commitment to safety, organizational safety measures and emergency preparedness. All of 
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these areas have been found to be important parts of safety climate in earlier studies (Gordon, 
1998; Mearns et al., 2003; Tharaldsen et al., 2008), and a decision of whether to remove or 
keep some of the items from the RNNP survey must be done with great caution.  
According to the PSA (2013a), the RNNP survey consists of 111 questions, plus 
demographic questions. This raises an issue of whether deterioration of the motivation of 
participants can affect the data obtained. Herzog and Bachman (1981) found that people tend 
to respond in a more stereotypical way in later parts of a long survey – but the effect is not 
necessarily big enough to affect the data in any substantial way. Cole, McCormick and 
Gonyea (2012) found that straight lining – i.e. selecting the same response option for a 
continuous set of items – increased over the length of surveys, and that the behavior is more 
frequent among males. This is an issue that should concern the PSA, particularly because the 
overwhelming majority of respondents of the RNNP survey are male, and that the length of 
the survey is substantial. These issues might be avoided by reducing the number of questions 
in the RNNP survey. 
 Another issue for concern is that certain items, particularly #6, #11, #17, #18 and #19 
of Appendix B, seem to be either double-barreled or ambiguously worded. An example of 
these issues can be seen in item #19 “I do not participate actively in HSE meetings”. This 
item forces the respondent to define “participate actively”, which is a subjective and 
undefined measure. It is difficult to determine what “actively” means, and as such it is 
impossible to extract any useful information from the data of this item. A rephrasing of the 
item into “I am reluctant to speak my mind in HSE meetings” or “HSE meetings do not 
interest me” might be a better choice, if the point is to investigate the respondents view 
towards the importance of HSE meetings or if a culture of conformity exists in the workplace. 
 As far as this author is aware, no qualitative assessment of the safety climate related 
items of the RNNP survey has been conducted since the survey was developed in 1999/2000. 
Although the PSA reports that the RNNP survey has been subject to improvements over the 
years (PSA, 2013a), this is only exemplified by the necessity of adding items when new 
topics are made current. With the psychometric, theoretical and conceptual issues in mind, it 
might be time to refurbish the RNNP survey and re-evaluate the purpose of assessing safety 
climate in the NCS by the use of quantitative measurement techniques such as surveys. 
Theoretical Issues of the Safety Climate Concept 
According to Cooper (2000), one issue with safety climate measurement is that many 
of the studies that have measured safety climate have combined attitudinal, behavioral, 
affective and descriptive constructs within the same measure. This may provide larger 
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correlations than if these constructs were measured with different measurement techniques 
(e.g. safety climate scores and accident frequencies), and this in turn might explain why 
different factor structures emerge from different research groups (Cooper, 2000). 
The fact that Cooper (2002) provides such a broad theoretical content of the three 
dimensions of safety climate points towards a larger issue within the field of safety climate 
and safety culture. Several scientists have pointed out that the concepts lack clarity when it 
comes to definitions, conceptualizations and possibly even validity (Cooper, 2000; Cox & 
Cheyne, 2000; Cox & Flin, 1998; Guldenmund, 2000; Mearns et al., 2003). These issues 
should be the main focus of scientists within the field, because as long as the content and 
definition of the concepts and how they relate to each other remain a topic of discussion and 
disagreement, there really is no point in trying to measure safety climate and safety culture 
through quantitative methods, as far as this author sees it.  
 Researchers within the organizational psychology field should, as a minimum, clarify 
the differences between the concepts of safety climate and safety culture. According to 
Antonsen (2009), the predominant way of measuring safety culture is through survey-based 
assessment – but because of the lack of clarity and agreement of the differences, or 
similarities, of safety culture and safety climate, it is not even clear whether the label 
“climate” or “culture” is more appropriate for certain studies (Antonsen, 2009). 
 Issues of the predictability of survey-based assessments of the safety culture within an 
organization is brought forward by Antonsen (2009), which compared the safety culture 
results of a survey conducted on the Snorre Alpha platform with qualitative investigations of 
a blowout incident on the same platform a year later. Antonsen (2009) found that there was a 
considerable gap between the safety culture assessment of the survey and the depiction of the 
safety culture through the post-accident investigation. Where the survey results depicted that 
safety was highly prioritized and risk assessments were carried out at all times, the 
investigation found that safety was discarded in favor of meeting production targets and that 
risk assessments were lacking (Antonsen, 2009). Furthermore, the survey indicated that 
communication was working well and that rules and procedures were complied with, but the 
investigation found that the communication climate was weak, that procedures were often 
breached and that a culture of non-compliance was dominant (Antonsen, 2009). This should 
be an eye opener to the major issues related to the measurement and assessment of safety 
culture and safety climate in high-risk industries. 
 The safety climate construct, and its connection with safety culture, is of great 
importance for understanding how industries such as the oil and gas industry can achieve as 
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few accidents and injuries as possible. Nevertheless, conceptual, psychometric and theoretical 
obstacles must be addressed if the safety climate construct shall remain useful for scientific 
investigation of employee’s perception of safety. The use of surveys to measure employee 
perception seems to be associated with low generalizability and issues with validity. These are 
basic methodological essentials that should make scientists question how they present 
findings of safety climate, and how safety climate can be measured in a more purposeful way. 
Perhaps the use of qualitative methods, such as interviews and focus group discussions might 
provide a more holistic picture of the safety climate of an organization. After all, the 
employee’s perceptions of their safety are what should be in focus, if the point is to reduce the 
risk of accidents in the organization. 
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Conclusion 
The goal of this thesis has been to answer the research question “What is a 
psychometric and theoretical sound way to measure safety climate?” through assessing the 
proposed dimensional structure obtained from analysis in light of the theoretical basis of the 
RNNP survey. This thesis has proposed a new dimensional structure, consisting of 30 items, 
for the concept of safety climate, based on exploratory principal component analysis of 52 
safety climate items of the RNNP survey. Principal components analysis shows that the 
proposed dimensional structure provides stronger factor scores, communalities and reliability 
than the dimensional structures of Tharaldsen et al. (2008) and Høivik et al. (2009). 
Furthermore, the proposed dimensional structure does fit with the theoretical basis of the 
RNNP survey, although the theoretical model defines safety climate in such a broad way that 
it is difficult to imagine any structure that would not fit. 22 of the 52 items where removed, 
either because of theoretical or psychometrical issues. 
This underlines that the safety climate and safety culture concepts still have significant 
potential for improvement: There is no unified definition or conceptualization of these 
concepts, and they appear to have low validity when measured through survey-based 
methodologies. These issues were seen as critical during the development of the RNNP 
survey (PSA, 2001), and it seems that they have yet to be solved. Improving these issues 
should be prioritized in future research within the field.  
The items of the RNNP survey give valuable information about the employees’ 
perception of the safety on their workplace. A thorough revising of the items’ wording should 
be conducted, in order to assure that no ambiguity is present and to strengthen the quality of 
the survey. The Hexagonal Safety Climate Structure suggested in this thesis provides a 
promising starting point for further development and improvement of the RNNP survey and 
the safety climate concept. Future research should focus on testing the dimensional structure 
against external and objective outcome variables such as accident and injury rates. Other 
essential measures of the strength of the dimensional model are the fit and congruence, as 
well as the concurrent and predictive validity. In light of the current state of the safety climate 
concept, it is essential that these measures are objects of future testing of the model.  
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Appendix A 
The RNNP survey, english version 
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Appendix B 
Removed items and reason for removal 
 
Removed items and reason for removal 
Items Reason for removal 
1) There have been dangerous situations because people 
have been under the influence of alcohol or drugs at 
work 
Multi-factorial loading, extracted 
communality < .35 
2) My workplace is often messy Theoretical assessment, extracted 
communality < .35 
3) The safety delegates do a good job Multi-factorial loading, extracted 
communality < .35 
4) The HSE laws and regulations are not good enough Multi-factorial loading, extracted 
communality < .35 
5) I feel sufficiently rested when I am at work Multi-factorial loadings 
6) Communication between me and my colleagues often 
fail in a way that may lead to dangerous situations 
Ambiguous formulation, theoretical 
assessment 
7) Risk-filled work operations are always carefully planned 
before they are begun 
Multi-factorial loadings 
8) It is easy to tell the nurse/company health service about 
complaints and illnesses that might be work-related 
Multi-factorial loadings, theoretical 
assessment 
9) I experience a pressure to not report personal injuries or 
other incidents which may “mess up the statistics” 
Multi-factorial loadings 
10) The accident preparedness is good Multifactorial loadings 
11) The work permit (WP) system is always adhered to Multifactorial loadings 
12) In practice, production takes priority over HSE Multifactorial loadings 
13) I feel uncomfortable pointing out breaches of safety 
rules and procedures 
Multifactorial loadings, extracted 
communality < .36 
14) Information about undesirable incidents is used 
efficiently to prevent recurrences  
Theoretical assessment, extracted 
communality < .36 
15) I feel a group pressure which affects HSE assessments Multifactorial loadings, theoretical 
assessment 
16) There is enough manning to properly safeguard HSE Multifactorial loadings 
17) My lack of knowledge of new technology may 
sometimes increase accident risk 
Multifactorial loadings 
18) At times, I am pressured to work in ways that threaten 
safety 
Multifactorial loadings, extracted 
communality < .40 
19) I do not participate actively in HSE meetings Multifactorial loadings, ambiguous 
formulation 
20) I am unsure about my role in the emergency 
preparedness organisation 
Multifactorial loadings, theoretical 
assessment 
21) I doubt that I will be able to perform my emergency 
preparedness tasks in case of an emergency 
Multifactorial loadings, theoretical 
assessment 
22) Increased cooperation between a facility and land 
through IT systems has led to less safe operations 
Extracted communality < .30, 
theoretical assessment 
Note. Items translated from Norwegian by the PSA  
